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Abstract
This note provides technical background information on some contents of the
report Wealth of the Nation: Scotland’s Productivity Challenge (Kelly et al.,
2018). The report shows that Scotland’s productivity performance is only mid-
dling in the OECD: Scotland would need to close a productivity gap of 20% to
reach the top quartile of most productive OECD countries. It also illustrates
that this gap can be attributed to a relatively low capital stock and low Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) in equal measure. In this note, we make transparent
the data and assumptions underlying these calculations.
JEL Classification codes: E01, F40, O52, R11
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1 Introduction
This note provides technical background information on some contents of the report
Wealth of the Nation: Scotland’s Productivity Challenge, published by the David
Hume Institute on 6 September 2018 (Kelly et al., 2018). Specifically, Chapters 2
and 3 of the report informally lay out a model of the drivers of Scottish aggregate la-
bour productivity, and place Scotland’s productivity performance in an international
context. Here, we describe the underlying model formally. We then show how the
model in conjunction with publicly available data on Scotland’s economy can be used
to compare Scottish productivity and its components with the performance of other
countries.
The workings described in this note rely heavily on the methodology for the ana-
lysis of international income differences established in the “development accounting”
literature, popularised by Hall and Jones (1999), as well as some data and meth-
ods used by the latest edition of the Penn World Table (PWT). Caselli (2005) offers
a comprehensive overview of the development-accounting approach to international
income differences. A complete description of the contents, sources and methods un-
derlying the PWT 9.0 can be found in Feenstra et al. (2015). In addition to these
articles, we use some recent results about development accounting in open economies
established by Cuñat and Zymek (2018).
The purpose of the note is to make transparent the data and assumptions under-
lying the figures in Kelly et al. (2018) which cannot be straightforwadly compiled on
the basis of readily available national statistics. We welcome comments from other
interested parties on ways to improve on the data and the methods used here, or on
their presentation. It is our hope that such discussions will help advance the measure-
ment of economic activity in Scotland, and contribute to an informed debate about
Scottish economics.
The remainder of this note is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the formal
model underlying our analysis. Section 3 explains how to construct the data needed to
operationalise the model for international productivity comparison. Section 4 briefly
discussed our findings.
2 Model
2.1 Model Description
2.1.1 Preferences and Endowments
There are n = 1, ..., N countries − each with a representative consumer and each
producing a unique, country-specific good. The representative consumer in n receives
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income from capital and labour and maximises final consumption by aggregating
goods from different sources with a CES aggregator:
Cn =
(
N∑
n′=1
c
θ
1+θ
n′n
) 1+θ
θ
, (1)
where Cn is final consumption in n; cn′n is consumption by the representative con-
sumer in n of the good produced by country n′; and θ > 0. The representative
consumer in n maximises (1) subject to their budget constraint:
N∑
n′=1
pn′ncn′n ≤ rnKn + wnLn, (2)
where pn′n is the price of the country-n′ good in n; Kn is the capital stock in n; Ln
are the number of hours worked by the representative consumer in n (which are taken
as given); rn is the rental rate of capital; and wn is the hourly wage in n.
2.1.2 Technologies
Firms in country n produce the specific country-n good using a technology described
by the following production function:
Qn =
[
AnK
α
n (hnLn)
1−α
1− µ
]1−µ  1
µ
(
N∑
n′=1
x
θ
1+θ
n′n
) 1+θ
θ
µ , (3)
where Qn is output of the country-n good; hn is workforce skill in n; An is total
factor productivity in n; xn′n is use of the country-n′ good as a production input in n;
α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share of production; and µ ∈ (0, 1) is the intermediate-input
share of production. Note that (3) implies that production in country n uses not only
capital and labour but also some of the output of all countries as intermediate inputs.
2.1.3 Market structure
All goods and factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Capital and
labour cannot move across borders.
Final consumption cannot be traded, but all country-specific goods can be traded
between countries subject to an “iceberg” trade cost: if one unit of good is shipped
from n′ to n, only a fraction 1/τn′n < 1 arrives in n. We impose the normalisation
τnn = 1 for all n. Therefore, denoting by pn′ the price of the country-n′ good in its
home market,
pn′n = τn′npn′ . (4)
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Market clearing requires
Qn =
N∑
n′=1
τnn′ (cnn′ + xnn′) , (5)
i.e. the output of country-n goods needs to equal the amount of country-n goods
used in final consumption and production by all countries (inclusive of the portion of
goods lost in transit).
2.2 Model Implications
2.2.1 Expenditure-Side Real GDP
Given the assumptions made in Section 2.1, it is straightforward to show that the
“ideal” price index of the representative consumer in country n is
Pn ≡
(
N∑
n′=1
p−θn′n
)− 1
θ
. (6)
The real GDP of country n at consumer prices can then be written as
Y en ≡
rnKn + wnLn
Pn
=
(
pn
Pn
) 1
1−µ
AnK
α
n (hnLn)
1−α , (7)
where the second equality follows from the model’s equilibrium conditions. Y en is
described as “expenditure-side real GDP” in PWT since version 8.0 (Feenstra et al.,
2015). It corresponds to the traditional measure of “real income” used in international
comparisons: income evaluated at local consumer prices. Differences in expenditure-
side real GDP across countries reflect differences in the consumption possibilities
afforded by a countries’ GDPs − and are thus closely related to differences in welfare.
2.2.2 Output-Side Real GDP
Since edition 8.0, PWT also features a second real-GDP concept: “output-side” real
GDP. It is defined as the revenue function of a country, evaluated at constant prices.
In the model of Section 2.1, the revenue function of country n can be defined as
Rn (pn, Pn;Kn, Hn) ≡
≡ max
{xn′n}n′

[
AnK
α
n (hnLn)
1−α
1− µ
]1−µ  1
µ
(
N∑
n′=1
x
θ
1+θ
n′n
) 1+θ
θ
µ − N∑
n′=1
pn′nxn′n
 . (8)
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Evaluating (8) at constant prices, we obtain
Y on ≡ Rn (p, P ;Kn, Hn) = piAnKαn (hnLn)1−α , (9)
where pi ≡ (p/P µ)1/(1−µ) is a constant. Therefore, differences in output-side real GDP
across countries reflect purely reflect differences in countries productive capacity −
capital endowments, hours worked, labour productivity and TFP. Output-side GDP
does not take into account to what extent prices allow countries’ productive capacity
to be turned into consumption possibilities.1
2.2.3 Productivity
Defining aggregate productivity as expenditure-side real GDP per hour worked (i.e.
the real consumption possibilities a country generates per work hour), we obtain
yen ≡
Y en
Ln
= kαn × h1−αn ×
(
pn
Pn
) 1
1−µ
× An, (10)
where kn ≡ Kn/Ln is the capital stock per (wo)man hour.
Equation (10) shows that differences in aggregate productivity across countries
can be attributed to four drivers: differences in capital-stocks per hour worked (kn);
differences in workforce skill (hn); differences in the output-expenditure price ratio
(“terms of trade”, pn/Pn); and differences in TFP (An).2
Data on yen, kn, hn, pn/Pn and An across countries can be obtained from PWT
9.0. However, the United Kingdom is only reported as a single political entity in this
database. In the following, we describe how we construct data on these variables for
Scotland.
1See Cuñat and Zymek (2018) for more details on the comparison between expenditure-side and
output-side real GDP in standard open-economy models.
2Note that, if there are prohibitive barriers to international trade,
pn
Pn
=
pn[∑N
n′=1 (τn′npn′)
−θ
]− 1θ −−−−−−−−−−→τn′n→∞∀n′ 6=n 1.
Traditionally, development accounting has been performed under the assumption that countries can
be represented as closed economies. As the above shows, there are only three drivers of productivity
in equation (10) if we assume that countries are closed. (Caselli, 2005) However, recent research
shows that accounting for variation in the “terms of trade” across countries is important for under-
standing measured international productivity differences. (Feenstra et al. 2015; Cuñat and Zymek,
2018)
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3 Data
3.1 Productivity
Productivity as defined above − that is, expenditure-side real GDP per hour, yen −
can be calculated easily for all OECD countries, including the UK but not Scotland,
using the data in PWT 9.0: yen = cgdpe/h. Note that the variable cgdpe is reported
in current purchasing-power adjusted dollars in PWT.
For Scotland, we take GDP statistics in current GBP from the Scottish government
website. We convert them into constant 2011 dollars by dividing by the UK GDP
price level at 2011 base from the PWT National Accounts supplement (vgdp/qgdp)
and multiplying with the 2011 dollar-Sterling exchange rate from PWT (1/xr). We
then turn them into current purchasing-power adjusted dollars by multiplying with
the PPP-per-2011-national-price ratio for the UK from PWT (cgdpe/rgdpe).3
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Note: Productivity is measured as purchasing-power-adjusted GDP per hour. Sources: Scottish Government, PWT 9.0, and
authors' calculations.
Productivity Across OECD Economies, 2014
 
Figure A1: OECD Productivity, 2014
Note: Productivity is measured as expenditure-side real GDP per hour. Sources: PWT 9.0,
Scottish Government, and own calculations.
This allows us the present comparable productivity statistics for OECD countries,
including the UK and Scotland, for the year 2014 − the latest year for which data is
available from PWT 9.0. These statistics are shown in Figure 1 of Kelly et al. (2018),
for convenience reprinted here as Figure A1. In the figure, all productivity numbers
3An assumption implicit in these calculations is that price indices calculated for the UK as a
whole are a reasonably close approximation for Scottish price indices. This assumption is would
be violated if Scottish consumers purchase very different products from the UK average, or if the
price of the same products were very different in Scotland from the rest of the UK. We believe any
departures of Scottish price indices from their UK-wide counterparts arising from such differences
are likely to be sufficiently minor as not to bias our productivity numbers significantly.
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are reported with Denmark as the base country (=100). We chose Denmark as the
base because it is exactly at the border to the top quartile of the OECD productivity
distribution, and its population size is similar to Scotland’s.
The figure shows that Scotland sits around the productivity median in the OECD.
It is more productive than many of the OECD’s poorer member countries, but slightly
less productive than the UK as a whole. Moreover, Scotland’s productivity is 20%
lower than Denmark’s − implying a sizeable gap between Scottish productivity and
the productivities found in the top quartile of OECD economies. Scotland is also 4%
less productive than Finland and 13% less productive than Austria, both of which
are relatively small OECD countries by population size.
3.2 Capital Stocks
Capital stocks per hour worked for OECD economies are readily available from
PWT 9.0: kn = ck/h.
For Scotland, we take the annual time series of aggregate gross fixed capital form-
ation in current GBP from the Scottish government website. We convert it into
constant 2011 dollars by dividing by the UK investment price level at 2011 base from
the PWT National Accounts supplement (vgfcf/qgfcf) and multiplying with the
2011 dollar-Sterling exchange rate from PWT (1/xr). This gives us a time series of
real aggregate investment in Scotland (in constant 2011 USD).
We now compute the Scottish capital stock using the perpetual inventory method,
following Caselli (2005).4 Suppose:
Krnt = Int + (1− δnt)Krnt−1, (11)
where Krnt is the capital stock of a country n in year t in constant dollars; Int is
aggregate real investment; and δnt ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. Given
an appropriate calibration of δnt, the size of the capital stock in some initial year 0,
and a time series of real aggregate investment for t = 1, ..., T , the formula in (11) can
be used to calculate the capital stock in n for all t = 1, ..., T .
We set δnt to match the UK capital depreciation rate reported in PWT 9.0
(delta).5 The Scottish annual time series of aggregate gross fixed capital formation
only starts in 1998, which makes this our “year zero.” As is standard in applications
of the perpetual inventory method, we impose that
Krn0 =
In0
δn + γn
, (12)
4This approach has a considerable pedigree in the international-comparisons literature. See
Caselli (2005) for a discussion of the underlying assumptions, and their limitations.
5Again, we are assuming here that the UK’s average capital depreciation rate is not too different
from Scotland’s.
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where δn is the average depreciation rate in country n; and γn is the average growth
rate of real investment. Equation (12) represents the relationship between capital
stock and investment which we would expect to prevail in steady state, given (11).
For the UK, and by our assumption for Scotland, the average depreciation rate was .04
in the 1998-2014 period. The average growth rate of real investment for Scotland was
.02. This gives us enough information to compute an annual time series of constant-
dollar capital stocks for Scotland from 1998 to 2014. For consistency with PWT,
we convert it into current purchasing-power adjusted dollars by multiplying with the
capital-PPP-per-2011-national-price ratio for the UK from PWT (ck/rkna).
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Sources: Scottish Government, PWT 9.0, and authors' calculations.
Scottish Capital Stock, 1998-2014
 
Figure A2: Scottish Capital Stock, 1998-2014
Note: Capital stock/GDP is Kn/Y en . Kn, Y en for Scotland are calculated as described in the text.
Sources: PWT 9.0, Scottish Government, and own calculations.
Figure A2 plots the capital/GDP ratio for Scotland which arises from our com-
putations. The figure shows that this ratio has increased from a value of around 2
in 1998 to a value of around 3.5 by 2014. There is also some sense that the rise in
capital/GDP ratio has levelled off since 2010. The numbers we obtain pass a basic
plausibility test. Feenstra et al. (2015, Online Appendix) show for a sample of 143
countries in 2005 that the median value of capital/GDP is 2.7, corresponding to the
dashed line in the figure. They find that the large majority of capital/GDP ratios
are in the range 2-4. The capital/GDP ratio for Scotland which we have calculated
is thus in the same ballpark as the corresponding ratios of many other countries.
3.3 Workforce Skill
For OECD economies, PWT 9.0 provides the standard index of workforce skill (“hu-
man capital”) in international comparisons: hn = hc.
8
This index is calculated for each country based on the average number of years
of formal schooling in the adult population. Letting sn denote the average years of
schooling in country n,
lnhn =

.134× sn if sn ≤ 4
.101× (sn − 4) + .134× 4 if 4 < sn ≤ 8
.068× (sn − 8) + .101× 4 + .134× 4 if 8 < sn
. (13)
The form of equation (13) reflects evidence about the economic returns to schooling
from Mincer wage regressions (see Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005 for details). To
construct the corresponding value of the index for Scotland, we require information
on the average years of schooling in the Scottish adult population.
PWT relies on schooling data from Barro and Lee (2013) and Cohen and Leker
(2014). These datasets contain information on the average years of schooling in the
adult population for the UK as a whole, but not for Scotland. The UK years of
schooling are reported in column 1 of Table A1 for the years 2000-2014.
(1) (2) (3)
UK UK Scotland
PWT 9.0 own/ own/
EUROSTAT EUROSTAT EUROSTAT
2000 12.6 12.8 12.9
2001 12.7 12.8 13.0
2002 12.8 12.9 13.1
2003 12.9 13.0 13.1
2004 13.0 13.0 13.2
2005 13.0 13.0 13.2
2006 13.1 13.1 13.3
2007 13.2 13.2 13.4
2008 13.3 13.2 13.4
2009 13.4 13.3 13.4
2010 13.4 13.3 13.4
2011 13.5 13.4 13.6
2012 13.5 13.5 13.6
2013 13.5 13.5 13.7
2014 13.6 13.6 13.8
Table A1: Average Years of Schooling in the Adult Population, 2000-2014
Sources: PWT 9.0, EUROSTAT, and own calculations (see text).
We were unable to find data on the average years of schooling in the Scottish adult
population. However, EUROSTAT reports data on the percentage of the UK and
9
Scottish populations with “less than primary, primary and lower secondary education
(levels 0-2)”; with “upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels
3-4)”; and with “tertiary education (levels 5-8)”.6 Assuming that, in a UK context,
the average person in the first category has had 10 years of formal schooling; the
average person in the second had 13 years of schooling; and the average person in the
third had 16 years of schooling, we arrive at the numbers reported in columns 2 and
3 of Table A1.
As the table shows the average number of years of schooling in the UK adult
population based on EUROSTAT data and our assumption is virtually identical to
the average number reported in the Labor supplement of PWT 9.0 for the 2000-2014
period. This suggests that our assumption about the average years of schooling in
the different education categories is reasonable. Since Scotland has a slightly higher
population share with education levels 3-4 and 5-8, we find that Scotland’s average
years of schooling are slightly higher than those for the UK population as a whole.
Correspondingly, after applying the formula in (13), we obtain a slightly higher index
of workforce skill for Scotland than PWT 9.0 reports for the UK as a whole.
3.4 Terms of Trade
From equations (7) and (9), it is clear that the “terms of trade” term in the pro-
ductivity accounting equation (10) can be thought of equivalently as the ratio of
expenditure-side and output-side real GDP:
Y en
Y on
=
1
pi
(
pn
Pn
) 1
1−µ
. (14)
That ratio is available in PWT 9.0 for all OECD countries: cgdpe/cgdpo. Variations
of this ratio across countries reflects variations in the ratio of the expenditure-side
and output-side PPP price indices used in PWT. The expenditure-side PPP is the
traditional measure of differences in purchasing power of a given nominal income
across countries. The output-side PPP deflates nominal incomes in a manner designed
to better reflect the productive capacity of countries. PWT constructs it from the
expenditure-side PPP by subtracting countries’ weighted import prices and adding
their weighted export prices (see Feenstra et al., 2015).
Constructing an output-side PPP for Scotland would be a difficult and data-
intensive exercise. Therefore, we avail ourselves of a short cut. The equilibrium
conditions of the model described in Section 2.1 imply that
mnn =
(
pn
Pn
)−θ
, (15)
6“Levels” here correspond to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
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where mnn is the share of country-n expenditure on its own goods. Combining (14)
and (15), we obtain
ln
Y en
Y on
= − ln pi − 1
θ (1− µ) lnmnn. (16)
For 43 countries, including the UK, the share of spending on non-imported output
for 2014 can be obtained from the World Input Output Database (2016 release; see
Timmer at al., 2015;). We plot their expenditure-side/output-side real GDP ratio
from PWT 9.0 against this share in Figure A3.
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Figure A3: Expenditure/Output Real GDP and Own Spending Share, 2014
Sources: PWT 9.0, WIOD (2016 release), and own calculations.
As can be seen from the figure, there is a negative relationship between the two
variables − just as equation (16) would suggest. Moreover, this relationship is very
close for most countries: the R2 of the line of best fit (shown as a red dashed line
in the figure) is .50. It has a constant equal to -.06, and a coefficient equal to -.39.
Assuming that departures from this line largely reflect measurement error, we can
infer that pi = 1.06 and θ (1− µ) = 2.56 would represent a reasonable calibration of
our model. Combining this with the 2014 share of spending on non-imported output
for Scotland − which can be calculated from the Scottish government’s input-output
table −, we obtain a “terms of trade” term for the Scottish economy.7
7There are two possible objections to our short-cut approach to calculating Scotland’s terms of
trade. The first is that equations (14) and (15) are derived from a model of international trade based
on very specific, and restrictive assumptions. However, it is by now well-known that isomorphic
expressions can be derived from a large class of standard quantitative trade models, based on a
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3.5 Capital Share
In line with equation (10), we impose a single capital share in production (α) for
all countries. This capital share is based on the output-side-GDP-weighted (cgdpo)
capital share for OECD countries reported in PWT 9.0 (1 − labsh). The value we
obtain is α = .41.
We impose a single capital share in production for expositional simplicity: it allows
us to perform the productivity decomposition in Section 4 in a fairly straightforward
manner. Country-specific capital shares would complicate the decomposition, and
may require a richer and more intricate description of countries’ production technolo-
gies than the one we have adopted here.8 Nevertheless, we should note that imposing
a common capital share across countries is not necessarily realistic. PWT data in-
dicates that even among OECD countries the capital share may vary. Whether such
observed variation reflects genuine differences in the average production technologies
countries employ, or measurement difficulties, remains an open question.9 We cannot
satisfactorily resolve this issue here, but hope that future research on productivity
will return to it.
3.6 Total Factor Productivity
Section 3.1-3.5 describe in detail how to compute aggregate productivity for all OECD
economies and Scotland, as well as the contribution of capital stocks, workforce skill
and the terms of trade. Based on this data, TFP can now be calculated as the residual
component of productivity, which accounts for all observed variation that cannot
be attributed to the other three drivers. This is the standard definition of TFP in
international income and productivity comparisons: it captures all differences between
countries which contribute to differences in productivity but cannot be quantified
directly.
4 Findings
Figure 4 in Kelly et al. (2018) uses the data assembled in Section 3 to decompose
Scotland’s productivity performance into four drivers of productivity introduced in
range of different microfoundations. (Arkolakis et al., 2012) The second possible objection is that
the model equations we use are expressed in terms of CES ideal price indices − while the PPPs
from the PWT, which we are trying to predict, are not. These PPPs are calculated using he Fisher-
Geary-Khamis method, which only approximates ideal price indices. Yet Cuñat and Zymek (2018)
show that the approximation is very close in the present context.
8In particular, our assumption of Cobb-Douglas technologies imposes a unitary substitution elasti-
city between capital and labour. One reason for differences in the capital share across countries may
be that the elasticity of substitution is, in fact, greater than one.
9The PWT capital share equals one minus the measured labour share. See Elsby et al. (2013)
for a discussion of the inherent difficulty in comparing labour shares across space and time.
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Section 2 − capital stocks, workforce skill, terms of trade, and TFP. For convenience,
the figure is reprinted as Figure A4 below. As in Figure A1, each country’s standing
with respect to a particular variable is expressed relative to the base country Denmark
(=100).
The first notable feature of Figure A4 is that, for the most part, OECD economies
differ little in their workforce skill (top left panel) and their terms of trade (bottom
left panel). On both indicators, Scotland’s performance is relatively favourable, but
since across-OECD differences are small, this has little relevance for Scotland’s overall
productivity performance in an OECD context.
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Drivers of Productivity Across OECD Economies, 2014
 
Figure A4: Drivers of OECD Productivity, 2014
Note: Each driver corresponds to one term in equation (10). By definition, the product of terms
corresponds to the productivity levels shown in Figure A1. Sources: For sources and underlying
calculations, see Section 3.
The second notable feature is that Scotland sits in the bottom half of OECD
countries in terms of its capital stock (top right panel) and TFP (bottom right panel).
These two drivers alone account for the full productivity gap between Scotland and
Denmark, with the capital stock and TFP each responsible for roughly half of it.
As discussed in Kelly et al. (2018), both business and government investment
has been consistently lower in Scotland than in the rest of the OECD − which helps
explain Scotland’s relatively low capital stock per work hour. By definition, the
factors behind Scotland’s low TFP are less tangible. Kelly et al. (2018) point towards
the business environment, the size and quality of firms, management quality and
population demographics as possible contributors to low TFP.
One goal of the development accounting literature has been to reduce the reliance
on indirectly observed TFP in explaining income and productivity differences. It has
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attempted to do so by introducing more complex models of the drivers of productivity,
and by improving the measurement of these drivers. (Caselli, 2005) Here, we have
laid out a relatively simply and conventional model of the drivers of productivity,
and we have attempted to give a complete account of our best attempt to quantify
the role of these drivers for Scotland. Yet it is possible that the model we have used
is too simple, and likely that our data compilation leaves room for improvement −
and that this explains the large part of Scotland’s productivity under-performance
relative to other OECD countries which our exercise attributes to TFP. We hope that
a lively discussion of the sources and methods we have employed, and future work
in this area, will improve our ability to identify the causes of low productivity − in
Scotland, and beyond.
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